In 2011, C.-T. Li et al. proposed a secure user authentication scheme, which is an improvement over Kim et al.'s scheme to resolve several security flaws such as off-line password guessing attack and masquerading attack. C.-T. Li et al. claimed that their scheme prevents smart card security related attacks. Moreover, it provides mutual authentication and session key establishment. However, we found that their scheme is vulnerable to password guessing attack through password change phase, smart card forgery attack and stolen verifier attack. Moreover, C.-T. Li et al.'s scheme is not secure against password guessing attack as they claimed. In this paper, we also point out that their scheme is not practical to use. 
Ⅰ. Introduction
A remote user authentication mechanism is a procedure which using password and smart card to verify if the communication parties are trustable and legitimate. In the past couple of decades, there have been many researches [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] about remote user authentication over insecure network.
In 2002, Chien et al [1] . proposed an efficient password based remote user authentication scheme which can provide mutual authentication. In Chien et al.'s scheme, users are allowed to choose the password without registering with the server. In 2004, Lee et al [2] . gave a cryptanalysis to Chien C.-T. Li et al [6] . proposed a secure user authentication scheme, which is an improvement to Kim et al.' scheme.
In this paper, we present C.-T. Li et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to password guessing attack through password change phase, smart card forgery attack and stolen verifier attack. In addition, we found that their scheme is not secure against password guessing attack as they claimed. Furthermore, we point out that their scheme is unjustifiable and not practical to use.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review C. 
Registration phase
In this phase, the user  registers with the server  by performing the following steps. Afterward,  sends the  with parameters ,   ,  through a secure communication channel to .
R.1. ⇒  ⊕

R.3. ⇒     
After receiving ,  stores   into . Note that 's  contains      .
Login phase
If  wants to login , firstly, he inserts his own  into a card reader or the terminal and enters his ,  and   . Where   is a new generated random number used for next login request. Then  performs the following steps: L.1.  generates a random number  and computes:
Verification phase
Upon receiving the login request,  has to perform the following steps to authenticate :
Otherwise,  computes:
 successfully authenticates  if the third entry ⊕   is equal to   and computes:
Here,   ′ is equal to   ,  obtains   and  by decrypting   . Then  replaces the third entry ⊕   with    ⊕   and generates a random number , then computes:
Finally,  sends       to  and the format of  is shown as follows:
V.2. →  
After receiving the message from ,  computes: Then  computes: 
 does the computing as regular pattern then sends        to the server. Consequently  can not pass the verification phase since  computes   using the    and check it as follows:
If    ≠⊕  ,  rejects the current session. Therefore  has to face denial of service due to the smart card forgery. 
Stolen verifier attack
Herein,  can do this until    is equal to   .
Drawbacks
During the registration phase,  selects a random number   and has to remember it until he gets his own smart card from  to store it. Because   is hard to be remembered by , he may record it by writing down on a slip of paper and protect it. It is an unjustifiable and impractical to use.
Ⅳ. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented cryptanalysis of C.-T. Li et al.'s scheme. We point out that their scheme is vulnerable to password guessing attack through password change phase, smart card forgery attack and stolen verifier attack. In addition, C.-T.
Li et al.'s scheme is not secure against password guessing attack as they claimed. Furthermore, we point out that their scheme is not practical to use.
To remedy these security flaws, we suggest that when a user wants to enter the smart card, his identity and password should be verified. At the same time, some secure parameters should not be stored in the account table without any encryption.
Moreover, some technologies such as PKI(Public-key infrastructure) and OTP(one time password) can be used to improve the security of the remote user authentication scheme.
